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IN-HOUSE LIVE-CLIENT CLINICAL
PROGRAMS: SOME ETHICAL ISSUES
James E. Moliterno*
INTRODUCTION
N recent years, clinicians and classroom professional responsibility
professors have found themselves in one another's company
through several different conferences and related devices.' This cross-
over of interest in what one another does and the connections be-
tween and common interests of the two enterprises is healthy and
overdue. As long as clinicians are the practice-teachers and profes-
sional responsibility professors teach about and study the law and cul-
ture of the practice, the crossover should be nurtured and developed.
Some of those crossover occasions have given rise to concerns by
classroom professional responsibility teachers that clinicians pay too
little attention to the law of professional responsibility and to renewed
concern by clinicians that classroom professional responsibility teach-
ers are out of touch with the day-to-day rigors of practice, especially
poverty practice.
Divisions between clinical faculty and classroom professional re-
sponsibility teachers are, in fundamental ways, not as sharp as they
may appear. Some clinicians teach professional responsibility law in
classroom settings; all clinicians teach professional responsibility in
some form of that phrase's meaning; and all professional responsibil-
ity professors teach about the practice of law, the grist of the clini-
cian's mill.
This paper is a small part of the continued crossover of interest. It
is about ethical issues that attach themselves or arise with special fre-
quency in law school and in-house clinical programs. It raises ques-
tions that need further discussion as much as it attempts to answer
those questions.
I have broken the paper into two sections. The first identifies and
examines broad, overarching questions about the ethics of clinical
legal education: What is the morallethical value in clinical education?
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, College of William & Mary School of Law.
The author is grateful to Ann Luerssen for her research assistance on this project.
1. Occasions that come to mind, among many, are the 1995 AALS Joint Program
of the Clinical and Professional Responsibility Sections; the Keck Foundation sup-
ported conference at Duke in October 1995 (papers and proceedings published in
Symposium, Teaching Legal Ethics, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer/Autumn 1995,
at 1); and the March 1996 and March 1997 Keck Foundation supported conferences
on teaching legal ethics at William & Mary (papers and proceedings published in
Symposium, W.M. Keck Foundation Forwn on the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1 (1996); and Symposium, 1997 W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on Teach-
ing of Legal Ethics, 39 Vm. & Mary L. Rev. 283 (1998)).
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Is there an inherent conflict between the educational and the service
missions of clinics? Can clinicians teach legal practice and, simultane-
ously, be the practice about which they teach (this is Professor
Condlin's question)?2
The second section identifies and examines applications of the pro-
fessional responsibility rules to law school clinics, selecting out a hand-
ful of situations that are either unique to law school clinical practice or
that arise with special frequency or character in law school clinical
practice such as: conflicts of interest among law students with other
job commitments (either concurrent or summer), interclinic conflicts,
and confidentiality applications.
I. THE BROAD ISSUES
Clinical legal education has a combination of goals, among them,
providing professional skills instruction,3 teaching methods of learning
from experience,4 instructing students in professional responsibility,5
serving clients (poor people in particular), 6 and critiquing the capaci-
ties and limitations of lawyers and the legal system.7 This combina-
tion, especially the goals of providing client service (good lawyering)
and critiquing the practice and profession of law, presents the rub that
has long bedeviled thoughtful clinicians. Some might say this rub is
too much for clinical legal education to bear; others might find the
difficulties the rub presents are overwhelmed by the beneficial effects
of active learning that are found in experiential education vehicles like
clinics and by the services clinics provide.
The benefits of active learning devices such as clinics for the pur-
poses of enhancing students' ethical and moral compass and their
learning of professional responsibility law are significant for several
reasons. In Aristotelian terms, clinical experiences allow students to
develop virtue by the doing of virtuous acts. Clinical teaching lends
itself to student enculturation into the profession. Clinical experience
helps to develop the student's understanding of professional responsi-
bility law because so much of that law concerns the relationships to
which lawyers are parties.
2. See Robert J. Condlin, Clinical Education in the Seventies: An Appraisal of the
Decade, 33 J. Legal Educ. 604, 607 (1983); Robert J. Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes:
Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 Md. L. Rev.
223, 281-82 (1981) [hereinafter Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes]; Robert J. Condlin,
'Tastes Great, Less Filling' The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. Legal
Educ. 45, 45 (1986) [hereinafter Condlin, Tastes Great, Less Filling];.
3. See Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. Legal
Educ. 508, 512-13 (1992) [hereinafter Report].
4. See id. at 513.
5. See id. at 513-14.
6. See id. at 515.
7. See id. at 516.
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A. Clinical Teaching Has a Positive Moral-Ethical Vahte
Whether done in clinics or classrooms, professional ethics teaching
serves an arguably higher and unquestionably more elusive goal than
is served by legal education generally. This goal has been character-
ized as the teaching of "character," "integrity," "virtue," and "val-
ues." 8 This goal, however characterized, is not uniformly regarded as
being achievable.9 Indeed, whether the law school experience gener-
ally, and course work in ethics specifically, can positively affect stu-
dents' moral development at all has been the subject of considerable
debate.10 The empirical evidence that exists indicates that neither the
standard first-year law experience nor the single semester, free-stand-
ing legal profession course has a measurable effect on students' val-
ues.' Those who argue that ethics and virtue can be taught to law
students argue from an Aristotelian view-influenced by Kohiberg's
8. See James R. Elkins, The Pedagogy of Ethics, 10 J. Legal Prof. 37, 37-39 (1995)
(discussing "virtue"); Donald C. Mulcahey, A Plea for Moral Education in Law
Schools, 2 J.L. & Religion 101, 102 (1984) (discussing "values"); Terrance Sandalow,
The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. Legal Educ. 163, 169 (1984) (discuss-
ing "character"); John V. Tunney, Is the Bar Meeting Its Ethical Responsibilities?, 12
San Diego L. Rev. 245, 247 (1975) (discussing "integrity"). There are obvious differ-
ences among the various characterizations, but all name a goal of teaching of a higher
order than the mere conveyance of knowledge about a set of rules, whose violation
may produce a penalty. They name a human character trait of higher order than
obedience to authority.
9. The goal is also not uniformally regarded as desirable. For references to those
who say that legal education should remain "value neutral," see infra note 10. In an
interesting display of both candor and contemporaneous feelings of helplessness and
hopefulness, Justice Tom C. Clark has said that even though many academics say that
they cannot teach virtue, they must, because no one else can either. See Tom C. Clark,
Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 San Diego L. Rev. 249, 253 (1975).
10. I leave aside the related question of whether the law school should attempt to
teach values, see, e.g., Rand Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Moral Vision and Profes-
sional Decisions: The Changing Values of Women and Men Lawyers 44 (1989)
("Only through training do most lawyers develop an 'indifference to a wide variety of
ends and consequences that in other contexts would be of undeniable moral signifi-
cance."' (quoting Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Is-
sues, Hum. Rts., Fall 1975, at 1, 5)); Donald T. Weckstein, Boulder 1k. Why and How,
41 U. Colo. L. Rev. 304,306 (1969) (stating that "law schools can make a small contri-
bution to [teaching values], but [their] main concern should be directed to other ar-
eas"), and the argument that the overall law school experience is a negative teacher of
ethics, see, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 Yale Rev.
L. & Soc. Action 71, 71 (1970) (criticizing the current "malaise" in law schools); Paul
N. Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 Yale ". 444, 487 (1970)
(arguing that "talk about democratic values and social policy is just so much crap").
11. See Jethro K. Leiberman, Crisis at the Bar. Lawyers' Unethical Ethics and
What to Do About It 226 (1978); Robert M. Ackerman, Law Schools and Profes-
sional Responsibility: A Task for All Seasons, 88 Dick. L. Rev. 202, 205-06 (1983);
Jerome E. Carlin, What Law Schools Can Do About Professional Responsibility, 4
Conn. L. Rev. 459, 459 (1971-72); Harry W. Jones, Lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy
Ethics of Partnership, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 957, 959 (1978). Sandelow writes:
Law schools are not, to be sure, well positioned to play a decisive role in
forming their students' characters. Students come to law school as adults.
The deplorable faculty-student ratio at all law schools largely precludes a
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work-12 -that virtue can be learned by adults primarily through doing
virtuous, role-sensitive acts. They argue that a student begins to de-
velop a role-sensitive morality on the first day of the law school expe-
rience, and not before.13 Certainly, to the extent that the would-be
lawyer begins to develop "attitudes and insights" into the role of law-
yer on the first day of law school,14 the law school experience will
affect, for good or ill, the student's level of virtue.15
Nearly everyone who argues that virtue can be taught bases the ar-
gument on the Aristotelian view that virtue is learned by the doing of
virtuous role-sensitive acts. Someone making the Aristotelian based
argument expects both the standard first year of law school and the
level of personal contact which might permit faculty members to become an
important personal influence in the lives of their students.
Sandelow, supra note 8, at 169; see also Daniel S. Kleinberger, Wanted: An Ethos of
Personal Responsibility-Why Codes of Ethics and Schools of Law Don't Make for
Ethical Lawyers, 21 Conn. L. Rev. 365, 378 (1989) (stating that "the thrust of legal
education runs counter to moral instruction" and that "legal education actually alien-
ates students from whatever values they had when they entered [law] school"); Wag-
ner P. Thielens, Jr., The Influence of the Law School Experience on the Professional
Ethics of Law Students, 21 J. Legal Educ. 587, 591 (1969) (detailing a study that mea-
sured the change in law students' ethical views as they progressed through law
school); Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law
Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. Legal Educ. 306, 307 (1981)
(providing an overview of developmental psychology to explore the ethical limits of
teaching students to "think like lawyers"). Shaffer and Redmount seem to say that
legal education neither nurtures nor impedes students' moral development. See
Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert S. Redmount, Lawyers, Law Students and People
(1977).
12. See Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral
Stages and the Idea of Justice (1981). Kohlberg argues that people develop sequen-
tially through a series of stages of moral reasoning, the development continues into
adulthood, and only a small percentage of people ever reach the final stage. See id. at
101-89.
13. Implicit in every article arguing for a better way of teaching ethics in the legal
profession is the position that it can be taught. For a sampling of such articles, see
Michael J. Kelly, Legal Ethics and Legal Education 5-21 (1980); Elkins, supra note 8,
at 81-83; David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Pro-
gram for Legal Ethics, 40 Md. L. Rev. 451, 451-56 (1981); David Luban, Epistemology
and Moral Education, 33 J. Legal Educ. 636, 636-37 (1983) [hereinafter Luban, Episte-
mology]; Mulcahey, supra note 8, at 103; Sandelow, supra note 8, at 166-69; Thomas
L. Shaffer, Moral Implications and Effects of Legal Education or: Brother Justinian
Goes to Law School, 34 J. Legal Educ. 190, 191-98 (1984); Andrew S. Watson, Law-
yers and Professionalism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal Education, 8 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 248, 249-52 (1975) [hereinafter Watson, Lawyers and Professional-
ism]; Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological As-
pects of Legal Education, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 91, 104-06 (1968) [hereinafter Watson,
The Quest]; Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional
Responsibility, 16 J. Legal Educ. 1, 7-10 (1963). For a full explication of this position,
see Willging & Dunn, supra note 11.
14. See James P. White, Professionalism and the Law School, 19 Cumb. L. Rev.
309, 314 (1989).
15. Indeed, Watson suggests that the role-sensitive formation is suspended until
entry to law school. See Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra note 13, at 249-
52; Watson, The Quest, supra note 13, at 124-37.
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standard free-standing ethics-legal profession course, neither of which
allow the students to do much of anything save read and think about
legal issues and doctrine,' 6 to be utter failures if their goal were to
teach virtue. Even the apparent failure of the short-term clinical work
to affect moral development' 7 positively is explainable to the advocate
of the Aristotelian view because students usually lack the opportunity
to see the long-term results of their conduct on relationships, the qual-
ity of which form the basis for a system of ethics."8 If virtue can be
taught to law students, it is most likely to occur in long-term, experi-
ential learning vehicles such as year-long clinics. 19
B. Why Clinics are Good at Teaching the Role of Lawyer:
Playing a Game
Consider the respect in which the rules of ethics themselves (or
more generally, the law of lawyering) are analogous to the rules gov-
erning a game: the game cannot be played without reference to the
rules, but the performance by the players-while referenced to those
rules-really "responds to a sense of quality that seems far removed
from any set of rules."2 In this respect, learning to play the game well
(learning to lawyer ethically) is accomplished not so much by learning
the game's rules, though learn them the players must, as by the activ-
ity of playing (the experiences with lawyering behavior). Learning the
rules of the game can be separated from learning to play well in terms
of teaching methodology: a player might well learn the text and basic
meaning of the rules by reading and discussing them; but to learn the
subtleties that define what it means to play well, the player must expe-
rience the play itself.
Teaching professional responsibility law by supervised experience in
role-sensitive activities is especially advantageous for another reason.
Unlike other law subjects, the law of professional responsibility is
about lawyers' relationships. Lawyer experience is a significant part
16. Neither of these activities bear a close role-sensitive relationship to the ethics
of lawyering except that the lawyer, to be ethical, must provide competent service,
often requiring both reading and thinking about legal issues and principles.
17. See Eugene L. Smith, Some Sociological and Psychological Problems in Edit-
cation for Professional Responsibility, in Education in the Professional Responsibili-
ties of the Lawyer 295 (Donald T. Weckstein ed., 1970).
18. About 62% of in-house, live-client clinics are partial-year clinics (one quarter
or one semester). See Report, supra note 3, at 512.
19. Alternatively, one might argue that teaching the law governing lawyers and
the consequences of its breach will produce virtuous, or at least law compliant, acts.
See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897). This ap-
proach to producing enhanced moral behavior comports with behaviorist theories. See
Albert Bandura & Richard H. Walters, Social Learning and Personality Development
168-200 (1963); see also B.F. Skinner, About Behaviorism 193 (1974) ("[W]hat we feel
when we behave morally or ethically depends on the contingencies responsible for
our behavior.").
20. Elkins, supra note 8, at 41 (footnote omitted).
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of the law governing lawyers. For example, when a student is negoti-
ating in the role of lawyer, the student generates the data that gives
meaning to the rules that prohibit making false statements of fact to
others.21 By doing so, the student may see and sense the conflicts be-
tween the literal meaning of the prohibition and the nature of negotia-
tion as a process that implicates at least subtle techniques designed to
mislead. 2 What makes the activity invaluable to learning is the
unique role that lawyer conduct plays in the development of the rele-
vant legal standards. The effect and operation of the substantive tort
or contract law, for example, is experienced generally by members of
the society governed by the legal rules under study; the lawyer gener-
ally experiences the effect and operation of law in a vicarious way
through the direct encounters of the lawyer's clients with the law. 3
The lawyer experiences the law as an expert. Much of the substance
of'the law governing lawyers, on the contrary, is tied inextricably to
the relationships between lawyer and client, lawyer and lawyer, lawyer
and law makers or deciders, and lawyer and society.24 In other words,
much of the law governing lawyers is formed by a relationship that the
lawyer experiences, unlike other fields in which the lawyer typically
experiences the law only vicariously. As such, if they are so directed,
clinics will be especially effective at teaching the law of professional
responsibility.
Role-sensitive activities not only provide significant learning about
the data that give meaning to many standards governing lawyer be-
havior, but they also hold out the greatest hope for replicating the best
aspects of the apprenticeship system: those that produced the sociali-
zation of the moral lawyer through the influence of a supervisor-men-
tor who was better than the organized bar's rules assumed.2
21. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 (1998) (dealing with
truthtelling).
22. See James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 926, 931.
23. But see Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts Is Different, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 443 (1998) (discussing the direct encounters that lawyers themselves
have with contract law); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of
Negligence Law, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 649 (1998) (discussing the direct encounters that
lawyers themselves have with tort law).
24. This distinction in lawyer level of interaction with the law governing lawyers
and the rest of the substantive law partly explains the anomaly noticed by William
Simon between the general legal realist approach to law and the more formalist ap-
proach lawyers take to the "bounds of the law." See William H. Simon, Should Law-
yers Obey the Law?, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 217 (1996), reprinted in William H.
Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 77-108 (1998). Lawyers
may be less comfortable with some indeterminacy when they are the "client" upon
whose conduct the law operates than they are when they are merely the expert for
some other person who is the client. See id.
25. See Thomas Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18 St. Mary's L.J. 195,
217-18 (1986).
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The conditions and timing of professional socialization have shifted
in the last hundred years in American legal education. Office ap-
prenticeship-the law school of an earlier era-introduced the neo-
phyte to the principles of law and the principals-at-law
simultaneously. In "reading" law, the apprentice combined theory
and implementation in a gradually expanding responsibility. He be-
came a lawyer as he saw and assisted in real cases, in concrete situa-
tions, and with specific personalities. Exposed to live models of
practicing attorneys and clients, he possessed realistic bases for
learning the lawyer role. He coupled this increasing awareness with
the gradual assumption of the rights and obligations of a member of
the bar. Technical knowledge, prevailing practices, and professional
values were articulated one step at a time.26
Student role socialization is largely undeveloped at the time of entry
to law school.27 Taking advantage of this opportunity requires stu-
dents to engage in role sensitive activities in a psychologically mean-
ingful context,28 preferably early in their law school careers. 9
Over time, lawyers and the legal profession have lost something of
value that the apprentice system once provided: the sense of the law-
yer as a moral force in society. This sense can be replicated in a long-
term, in-house clinic. Hopes for regaining this moral sense rest pri-
marily with the law school.30 For law schools to fulfill these hopes,
they must take advantage of the opportunity to socialize students into
the profession by presenting the student, acting in the role of lawyer,
with the moral questions that face lawyers. Law schools can best facil-
itate this socialization by allowing students to face and reflect on these
questions in the academic environment "without the heavy weight
that self-interest [and modem law firm socialization] exerts on the
practitioner ...."31 Development of role and identity is the niche in
which professional school training fits in the overall process of sociali-
zation of new members into the ethics of the profession. Legal educa-
tion can be influential in that development,3 2 because the resolution of
role is delayed until at least the beginning of professional (especially
26. Dan C. Lortie, Laymen to Lawmen: Law Schools, Careers, and Professional
Socialization, 29 Harv. Educ. Rev. 352, 363-64 (1959) (footnote omitted).
27. See Lortie, supra note 26, at 363; Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra
note 13, at 249-50.
28. "[S]elf-concept crystallizes only where role performance is undertaken in a
psychologically meaningful context." Lortie, supra note 26, at 366.
29. See Clark, supra note 9, at 252-60; J. Michael Kelly, Notes on the Teaching of
Ethics in Law School, 5 J. Legal Prof. 21, 27 (1980) (recommending a small-section
"attorney-client relationship" class in the first year); White, supra note 14, at 316-317.
30. See Clark, supra note 9, at 253.
31. Andrew L. Kaufman, Problems in Professional Responsibility at xxix (3rd ed.
1989).
32. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Indoctrination Versus Relativity in Vahte Education, 6
Zygon 285, 305-08 (1972); David AJ. Richards, Moral Theory the Developmental
Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. Legal Educ. 359, 361
(1981).
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legal) education.33 In order to develop virtue, one must do virtuous
things,34 preferably under the guidance of a moral teacher.35 One can-
not morally develop by study alone.36
C. The Potential Good of Modeling Lawyer Behavior and the
Positive Moral-Ethical Contribution of Clinics
The question of who in the law school is responsible for teaching
ethics has occupied a considerable amount of legal educators' time
over the years.37 Although some of this attention has been focused on
the "pervasive method" of teaching ethics,38 most of the positive con-
tributions have focused on the faculty and administration of the law
school as role models.39
The notion of role modeling takes on several forms, from both posi-
tive and negative perspectives, live role models and storytelling. Gen-
erally, because student integration into the role of lawyer does not
begin until the start of law school,4" and because the development of
an identity or sense of self "largely results from emulation of those
who are respected,"41 an opportunity exists to affect the development
of students by the positive or negative4" examples that faculty set.
33. See Lortie, supra note 26, at 363; Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra
note 13, at 249-52.
34. See G.M. Dickinson, Moral Development Theory and Clinical Legal Educa-
tion: The Development of Professional Identity, 22 U.W. Ont. L. Rev. 183, 186-96
(1984).
35. See Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi (Samuel L. Clemens ed., Harper &
Brothers Publishers 1903) (1883); Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J.
Legal Educ. 222, 224-27 (1984); Luban, Epistemology, supra note 13, at 650-651.
36. See Luban, Epistemology, supra note 13, at 653.
37. See David H. Vernon, Ethics in Academe-Afton Dekanal, 34 J. Legal Educ.
205, 211 (1984); see also James E. Moliterno, Goodness and Humanness: Distinguish-
ing Traits?, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 203, 208 (1989) (arguing that the claim of moral superior-
ity often raised by clinicians may reduce the pressure on other faculty to be positive
role models).
38. See David T. Link, The Pervasive Method of Teaching Ethics, 39 J. Legal Educ.
485,486-87 (1989); Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Valley of Ethics: Professional Respon-
sibility and Educational Reform, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer/Autumn 1995, at
139, 142; E. Wayne Thode & T.A. Smedley, An Evaluation of the Pervasive Approach
to Education for Professional Responsibility of Lawyers, 41 U. Colo. L. Rev. 365, 366-
68 (1969).
39. See Summary of Action Taken by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association 21-22 (1989); Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of
the Law Professor: Three Neglected Questions, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 275, 276 (1986);
Richard Wasserstrom, Legal Education and the Good Lawyer, 34 J. Legal Educ. 155,
160 (1984); White, supra note 14, at 313-17.
40. See Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra note 13, at 250.
41. Id.
42. L.H. LaRue, Teaching Legal Ethics by Negative Example: John Dean's Blind
Ambition, 10 Legal Stud. F. 315, 316 (1986).
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This notion is not new,4 3 and in some respects it is no more than an
acknowledgment that legal educators endeavor to replace the best as-
pects of the apprentice system of law teaching, which university legal
education displaced in the late nineteenth century.' Certainly, this is
the aspect that is implicated by the socialization of lawyers into the
profession.
Although many faculty members may hesitate to serve as role mod-
els because of a legitimate fear of exploiting a captive audience 4 -
because "[t]he universal human need to have objects for modeling and
identity formation may be the single most important psychological
factor in the educational process[ ]"46-the effect of both the presence
and absence of positive models is too great to ignore. Example-teach-
ing, through active role modeling and storytelling, aims at instilling
the more elusive qualities of the ideal lawyer. Only the generic form
of the desired character traits, however, is likely to be transferred
from faculty to students because the law teacher is not typically mod-
eling lawyering behaviors .4  Nonetheless, considerable learning oc-
curs when students observe model behavior that expresses integrity,
commitment to quality, concern for the human condition, and a sense
of community.'
While there is value in the modeling of all of these traits, the sense
of community is the one trait that is perhaps most uniquely within the
power of law faculty as an entity to accomplish. The others might
more profitably come from exposure to models of lawyering behavior.
Lawyering models produce more readily transferable learning for the
students from the law school to law practice, and are not as easily
criticized as being virtuous in the ivory tower. On the other hand, the
faculty either has or does not have a sense of community, and the
faculty either does or does not convey it by its collective presence, its
attitude about the common enterprise, and its actions toward one an-
other and toward students.
43. "[T]eaching ethics is good; living ethics before one's class is incomparably bet-
ter." John C. Townes, Organization and Operation of a Lait' School, 2 Am. L Sch.
Rev. 436, 439 (1910).
44. For a history of the process of apprentice system replacement with university
legal education, see William R. Johnson, Schooled Lawyers: A Study in the Clash of
Professional Cultures 42-57 (1978), and a letter from Harvard Dean Ephraim Gurney
to University President Charles Eliot lamenting the earliest moments of the Langdel-
lian revolution in Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and
Men, 1817-1967, at 187-90 (1967).
45. Indeed, one reason said to oppose the pervasive method is that a single legal-
ethics professor might subvert the students. See Thode & Smedley, supra note 38, at
371.
46. Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra note 13, at 250.
47. To the extent they are modeling such behaviors, they usually do so only in the
context of the lawyer's rigorous legal analysis.
48. Professor Shaffer is perhaps the foremost advocate for a better developed
sense of community among lawyers and law schools. See Thomas L Shaffer, The
Legal Ethics of Belonging, 49 Ohio St. LJ. 703, 712 (1988).
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The closer the model is to the role that must be learned, the more
effective it will be.49 As such, the most effective modeling of lawyer
behaviors will be done by those modeling the role of lawyer. Students
may be exposed to those acting the role of lawyer in two ways: indi-
rectly, through storytelling and case studies of lawyers; and directly,
by working with a lawyer in either actual or simulated client service.
Clinical education provides the student the opportunity to work di-
rectly with a lawyer-one whose express goal is the modeling of virtu-
ous lawyer behavior. Such role modeling is direct with respect to
student involvement and emotional proximity, and it is more closely
connected to the behaviors to be modeled.5" Clinical faculty are likely
to have great influence on the moral development of their students
through their actions and their policy choices.
D. Moral and Ethical Questions Remain
Despite these positive contributions of clinics to students' moral
and ethical development, nagging questions remain to be explored
further.
Robert Condlin sent clinicians scrambling in the early eighties with
a series of critical articles.5' Professor Condlin raised a category of
moral failing in the in-house clinic: clinic teachers are reinforcing un-
desirable characteristics with controlling, dominating behavior.
Condlin has persuasively argued that a combination of in-house clinic
attributes make it a less than ideal place for students to learn the eth-
ics of the legal profession. Among these attributes is the tension of
the co-counsel relationship between faculty and student that drives
the faculty supervisor toward dominating behavior and diminishes the
opportunity for critique of practice. Essentially, Condlin argued that
while engaged in the practice being critiqued, clinicians are poorly
positioned to critique,52 causing them to rationalize their own practice
activities and, in the process, model "persuasion mode" domination of
students.53 The clinic teaches students to dominate clients because
students essentially pattern their interactions with clients after the cli-
nician's interactions with the student. Some critics of Condlin argued
that his objections were against the adversarial system within which
clinicians (and all lawyers) operate.54 Others confessed guilt to self-
reduced "charges" and argued that Condlin's complaint is about poor
49. The implication of this phenomenon is that "ideas about professional behavior
gathered from practicing lawyers will be eagerly grasped and emulated by the stu-
dent." Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra note 13, at 251 (emphasis added).
50. See Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 54 (1978).
51. See supra note 2 (listing articles by Condlin).
52. See Condlin, Tastes Great, Less Filling, supra note 2, at 51, 55.
53. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note 2, 233-35.
54. See Norman Redlich, The Moral Value of Clinical Legal Education: A Reply,
33 J. Legal Educ. 613, 614 (1983).
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execution of in-house clinical education.55 If Condlin is correct in as-
serting that the clinician's ego and the pressures of co-practice with
inexperienced students lead to manipulating and dominating behav-
ior, then he is also correct to say a dominating clinician is more dan-
gerous than a dominating classroom teacher because the clinician is
easily recognized by the student as the model of practice.56 Like it or
not, while some clinicians claim their teaching is the place for students
to learn the gentler arts,57 Professor Luban may be correct in observ-
ing that clinicians are drawn predominantly from former careers in
poverty law where one can be excessively adversarial and "on the side
of angels" simultaneously, a combination rich with negative ethics
teaching implications.58
There are underlying moral questions in the use of actual clients as
the means for the laudable end of lawyer training.59 The lives and
welfare of real people are at risk in the in-house clinic setting. This
fact underlies the clinic's value and simultaneously forces clinic super-
visors frequently to intervene. For students to learn effectively the
skills of problem solving inherent in identifying and treating ethical
issues, they must form the mental pathways that will later be useful in
their lifelong adventure in decision making.' ° They must have a free
hand in forming and nurturing a relationship with others. They are far
less likely to get this free hand for mental experimentation in a setting
in which the supervisor frequently intervenes or is, at least figura-
tively, over the student's shoulder at all times.
The model of the clinic, its inherent tension between educational
interests and service interests, and the clinic's policies on supervisor
intervention may communicate a great deal.61 Consider the situation
when the clinician observes the student making an error in judgment.
The error may be labeled serious or less so, and the evaluation will
often determine whether or not the clinician intervenes. For example:
55. See Gary Bellow, On Talking Tough to Each Other: Comments on Condlin, 33
J. Legal Educ. 619, 620 (1983).
56. Redlich takes a different view- the classroom teacher is a more dominant fig-
ure than the clinician because of the presence of other players in the student's clinical
experience. See Redlich, supra note 54, at 615-16.
57. See, eg., Gilda M. Tuoni, Teaching Ethical Considerations in the Clinical Set-
ting: Professional, Personal and Systemic, 52 Colo. L. Rev. 409, 413 (1981) (noting
that clinics are well-suited to explore personal values).
58. See Luban, Epistemology, supra note 13, at 660.
59. See generally Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 26-72
(Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1969) (1785) (confronting the moral conun-
drum of acting on "pure duty" and the true motivations behind human actions).
60. See Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind 82 (1986); Anthony D'Amato, The
Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerisn, 37 J. Legal
Educ. 461, 462 (1987); James E. Moliterno, The Secret of Success: The Small-Section
First-Year Skills Offering and Its Relationship to Independent Thinking, 55 Mo. L Rev.
875, 877-78 (1990).
61. For the philosophy of non-intervention, see Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 50,
at 22-24.
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(1) Student has researched the claims that a civil clinic client may have
and plans to draft and file a complaint on Client's behalf following the
upcoming spring break. Supervisor realizes that Student has failed to
account for the statute of limitations on one of Client's claims that will
run before Student plans to file the complaint; (2) In doing research
on Client's claim, Student has misinterpreted a case that, if properly
interpreted, would help Client more than Student thinks it does. The
interpretive error might arguably make a difference in an upcoming
hearing at which Student will represent Client; (3) As Supervisor ob-
serves, Student treats Client with disdain and insensitivity. Would
most clinic supervisors intervene in any of these three situations?
How grave, immediate, and irreversible must the harm to the client be
before the supervisor intervenes to prevent or ameliorate such harm?
Declining to intervene and giving students the free hand, which will
enhance their learning, can be dangerous to the client and send unin-
tended messages about the relative importance of the client and the
student's learning. When the clinician declines to intervene, and in-
stead allows the student to learn from the mistake either by letting the
situation play out in its entirety or by counseling with the student after
the bad performance, the clinician implicitly says to the student:
"Your education was more valuable than good service was to the cli-
ent." Such a message teaches and reinforces the idea that it is appro-
priate for the lawyer to care more about herself than the client.
Although in the run of cases clinic clients probably receive excellent
service, it is disturbing to read descriptions-which some seem to re-
gard as a triumph of clinical education-of a "disastrous [client] inter-
view... [which] provided [the clinic] student with.., valuable insight
into the 'whys' of his behavior62 and the avenues for change."63 The
62. The full description of the behavior follows:
He presents a videotape of a student-conducted interview with a distraught
young woman seeking a divorce. The woman has never seen a lawyer
before, does not have much money, and is not completely sure that she
wants a divorce. To even the most naive observer, it appears that the stu-
dent, reputed to be academically capable, is incredibly deficient in the inter-
personal skills of interviewing and counseling his young client. During the
course of the interview, the law student is unable to depart from strict aca-
demic orientation and authoritatively attempts to secure only the hard and
cold facts upon which his client could be granted a divorce, while contempo-
raneously ignoring the very personal nature of his client's problems. While
it appears that the client is emotionally unprepared and unwilling to commit
herself to an immediate separation from her husband and to registration on
welfare rolls, the law student seems to view such legal consequences as inevi-
table and directs all discourse toward those ends.
One could argue that the student's ineptitude in interviewing skills re-
sulted not only from a lack of training in client counseling, but also from his
general aversion, however unconscious, to the emotional matters before
him. While the student may have been skilled in discovering and analyzing
the legal facts of his client's predicament, he was unable to recognize emo-
tional factors. In this regard, the question arises whether the legal profes-
sion, "concerned with providing services to clients who are often struggling
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clinic supervisor of this student undoubtedly intervened more care-
fully to counsel about alternatives with the client who was "emotion-
ally unprepared and unwilling to commit herself to an immediate
separation from her husband and to registration on the welfare rolls,
... [although the student had] direct[ed] all discourse toward those
ends"' as inevitable legal consequences. Almost surely, the clinic su-
pervisor would not allow the "young" client who had "never seen a
lawyer before" to be pushed into actions by the "incredibly deficient
... interviewing and counseling" 65 of the student. Despite best ef-
forts, however, it is less certain the supervisor could provide the emo-
tional repair to the client as easily as the repair of the purely legal
aspects of the representation.66 If the same teaching of interpersonal
skills can happen without the infliction of human suffering, then it is
fundamentally immoral to use real clients as tools of training, hurting
people in the process with precisely the same sharp instrument that
the teaching is designed to blunt.
E. A Semester's Work May Be Ethically Misleading
Most live-client clinical experiences are one semester in length.67
Often, cases are carried over from previous students' work; new stu-
dents, unfamiliar with the nature of the relationship begun by the ear-
lier students except for what little can be gleaned from the file notes,'
are unlikely to have a well-developed relationship with the client. In
any event, the nature of the relationship may be cloudy for the stu-
dents for reasons that they have no real hope of discovering. Under
such circumstances, what little the students may learn about client re-
lationships may be misleading, having resulted more from the previ-
ous, unknowable actions of prior student-lawyers. A similar absence
of learning or mislearning occurs when students begin a relationship
with difficult circumstances should perpetuate a selection process which pro-
duces practitioners who are disinclined, relative to others in the population,
to respond with sympathy and understanding to emotional conflicts." In
spite of the seemingly disastrous interview conducted by the law student, the
videotaped clinical experience provided that student with an opportunity to
evaluate his actions and characteristic motivations in interviewing and advis-
ing his client. Inasmuch as the deficiencies of the interview were commented
on and analyzed by the clinical supervisor, the law student may have ac-
quired valuable insight into the "whys" of his behavior and the avenues for
change. It is in this respect that clinical education further aids in the per-
sonal as well as professional development of law students.
Tuoni, supra note 57, at 416 (footnotes omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id
66. For another example of the possible ill-effects of non-intervention, see Melt-
sner & Schrag, supra note 50, at 25-29.
67. See Report, supra note 3, at 520.
68. The file notes may be well done in terms of their rendition of the factual un-
derpinnings of the case, but are unlikely to reveal the nuances of the relationship.
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with a client and pass the case on to the next group of students.
Often, the realization of results from the quality of the early part of
the client relationship is delayed until much later activity for the client
is undertaken. As such, the lessons learned from the quality of early
aspects of the client relationships are lost for the students who en-
gaged in those early activities. Although, as Pincus said, "there is no
substitute for personally living through the circumstances which create
the ethical dilemma and for having personally to face the conse-
quences of the action or inaction which is used as a response to the
moral challenge,"69 very little facing of personal consequences occurs
in the few months of a semester's work in an in-house clinic. More
often the real consequences are passed along to others who have little
appreciation for their source, and those who created circumstances
that later produce bad consequences may be left to think that nothing
of consequence resulted from their poor lawyering.
II. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW ISSUES
There are two primary areas where professional responsibility law
issues arise in clinics: conflicts and confidentiality. Naturally, there is
some overlap between the two.70
Authority specific to law school clinical programs on most of these
issues is sparse or non-existent. Some of the authority cited in this
paper refers to law firms, some to government and corporate law of-
fices, and some to legal aid offices. For different topics, each is proba-
bly the best analogy to a law school clinic. None of the three is a
perfect match on all issues, in part because none of the three has an
explicit education mission, in part because of each one's particular dif-
ferences from the law school clinical practice settifig. Although little
has been written specifically about professional responsibility law ap-
plications to law school clinics, some analogies can be drawn from the
treatment of such issues in legal aid offices.7 '
69. William Pincus, One Man's Perspective on Ethics and the Legal Profession, 12
San Diego L. Rev. 279, 285 (1975).
70. Some law schools' clinical programs have waded into these issues in a very
constructive way, creating thoughtful policy documents. See, e.g., Memorandum from
Debbie Maranville, Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of
Law, to File (November 30, 1994) [hereinafter Maranville Memorandum] (on file with
author) (developing University of Washington School of Law Conflicts of Interest
Policy for the Clinical Law Program). Recent Clinical Section programs on conflicts
issues and policies show that many others have an interest in these issues.
71. See, e.g., Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Con-
fronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 337, 354-62
(1978) (rejecting any model which calls for a standard of lawyering for poor persons
different from that which governs private lawyers); Marshall J. Breger, Disqualifica-
tion for Conflicts of Interest and the Legal Aid Attorney, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1115, 1116
(1982) (arguing that attorneys who represent legal aid clients should be subject to the
same ethical obligations as members of the private bar because the fiduciary relation-
ship between lawyer and client demands loyalty to one's client); David H. Taylor,
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Let us take as an example a law school with a fairly well-developed
clinical program with four components: a criminal defense clinic, a
general civil practice clinic, a domestic violence clinic, and a housing
issues clinic. I say "components" because I might think of them that
way, as the clinical part of the curriculum and each clinic as a compo-
nent of the clinical part of the curriculum. The nature of the conflicts
and confidentiality issues, however, largely turn on the question of
treating each clinic as its own law office entity, or as a part of the
larger law school clinic law office, or broader still as if the clinics were
all a part of the law school's law office. This choice determines which
of the conflicts questions are thorniest, what sort of policies regarding
confidentiality and conflicts the clinics ought to have in place, and in-
deed, what some of the educational value of the clinic will be.
A. Lawyer Interests v. Client Interests Conflicts
Unlike the general lawyer population, a small portion of which is on
the job hunt at any given moment, nearly all law students are actively
searching for permanent and temporary (either summer or part-time
during the academic year) employment. When clinic students seek
employment in their community, potential conflicts develop between
the student's interests and the interests of the clients the student rep-
resents. A criminal clinic student who interviews with the opposing
prosecutor's office, a civil practice clinic student who interviews with
an opposing law firm or institutional defendant (a bank opposing the
student's client in a consumer law case, for example), or even a civil
practice clinic student who represents a spouse in a domestic relations
action and has accepted post-graduation employment with the local
legal services provider that represents the opposed spouse all present
conflicts issues under Model Rule 1.7(b).7 Such a conflict must be
disclosed to the student's client and the representation may only pro-
ceed if the client consents after consultation.73
One might argue that the student's interests would be aligned with
rather than opposed to the client's in such a circumstance: the student
would want to impress the prospective employer with her diligent, ef-
fective representation of the client. In some instances, students may
well react that way, but the argument ignores the very real possibility
that the student will want to curry favor with the prospective em-
Conflicts of Interest and the Indigent Client: Barring the Door to the Last Lawyer in
Town, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 577, 577-619 (1995) (suggesting alteration of ordinary profes-
sional ethics rules for the legal aid practice setting); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Com-
munity-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L Rev. 1101, 1129-56
(1990) (discarding the "individual zeal model" as applied to legal services practice
because of the need to allocate limited resources to worthy cases and legal services'
unique mission in serving the local community).
72. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) (1998).
73. See id Rule 1.7(b)(2); Committee on Prof'l Ethics, Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Formal Op. 79-37 (1979).
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ployer by compromising the client's interests. Under the circum-
stances, the client ought to be the one to determine whether the risks
are too great to bear.
This prohibition should not restrict the representation activities of
students merely because they have made mass mailings to a wide
range of prospective employers with whom this sort of conflict would
exist. Rather, the conflicts should only be a matter of consequence
when a student actively pursues a particular job opportunity, usually
denoted by the offer and acceptance of a job interview.74
B. Multiple-Client Conflicts and Related Confidentiality Issues
Several types of multiple-client conflicts may arise because of stu-
dents' multiple commitments during law school and because of the
overlap of caseloads of multi-part clinics. As would any law firm, a
clinical program must have conflicts check procedures in place to
avoid such occurrences." Otherwise, the supervising lawyers risk
discipline.
If a law school treats its clinics as one large law office or as if the
entire law school was a single law office, conflicts may exist between
"branches" of the same76 office.7 7 For example, the civil practice
clinic may find itself representing a battered spouse in a divorce action
while the criminal practice clinic is representing the batteror with re-
spect to criminal charges; a criminal clinic may represent a trespass
defendant, while the housing clinic represents the non-profit that set
up the housing facility at which the trespass defendant allegedly tres-
passed. 78 Treated as if they are a single law office, this multiple-part
clinic has a multiple-client conflict, and a gross one at that. Such con-
flicts would plainly violate Model Rule 1.7(a). Indeed, in many such
instances, the conflict would not be waivable by the clients because
the lawyers could not "reasonably believe[ ] the representation will
not adversely affect the relationship with the other client." 79
The simplest fix for these issues is a painful one for in-house clinics:
they must treat each clinic (or at least those that seem likely to de-
velop inter-office conflicts) as separate entities. That means, unfortu-
nately, separate office space,8" support staff, fax machines, and
74. See Committee on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Formal Op. 1991-1 (1991).
75. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.1(a) (1998).
76. See id. Rule 1.7(a).
77. See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1385 (2d Cir. 1976).
78. See Maranville Memorandum, supra note 70, at 2.
79. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a)(1).
80. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
995 (1967) (suggesting that two lawyers sharing office space can have a conflict of
interest in representation); Ethics Advisory Panel, Rhode Island Supreme Court, Op.
93-66 (1993) (stating that four lawyers who "share secretarial and office expenses" arc
considered a law firm); cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
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certainly separate faculty supervisors who may not consult one an-
other unless they ensure that they are not communicating client confi-
dences and are not creating conflicts. This is an odd circumstance for
an academic, and it is bound to diminish clinical faculty members' de-
velopment and breadth of experience.
It also means, and this may be most painful of all to some clinical
programs, that students must meet in separate seminar components
and must not share information about their cases and experiences.
This reality will reduce the educational value of what could otherwise
be interconnected in-house clinics. Clinical students have relatively
small caseloads81 and a correspondingly small range of interactions
with clients, courts, opposing lawyers, and others. Much of the value
of the experience is found in the opportunity to share their exper-
iences with other crinic students in their seminar meetings, get others'
reactions to their impressions, hear other students's experiences, and
share in the critique of them as well.' Operating each clinic as a sepa-
rate entity limits the range of other student experiences that each
clinic student will be able to hear about and discuss.
Even when a clinical program treats each clinic as its own entity,
multiple client conflicts arise. Students often have multiple jobs dur-
ing law school, even while working in a clinic. They also move fairly
readily from job to job, from year to year, and summer to summer.
These multiple commitments create the likelihood of students being
exposed to opposing parties in the same matter (for example, criminal
defense clinic student who works in the prosecutor's office), s3 multiple
parties nominally on the same side of litigation but with differing in-
terests (for example, environmental law clinic student works part-time
in a law firm that represents other environmental plaintiffs from those
represented by the clinic),' successive employment and clinic work
on opposite sides of a matter (for example, civil practice clinic student
worked in a law firm the prior summer that represents Bank, now civil
practice clinic represents consumers against Bank in a Truth-in-Lend-
ing matter).8 5 The examples and possibilities are limitless.
If careful screening is done, some of these multiple-client issues may
be avoidable. But in the context of an in-house clinic, what does
screening mean? It means, of course, all the usual things, such as re-
quiring lawyers (the students) to refrain from communicating with a
Formal Op. 88-356 (1988) (recognizing that two practitioners can share office space
and not be "regarded as constituting a firm" unless "they present themselves to the
public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm").
81. See Report, supra note 3, at 546-48.
82. See Christine M. Venter, Encouraging Personal Responsibility-An Alternative
Approach to Teaching Legal Ethics, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer/Autumn 1995,
at 287, 290-93.
83. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a).
84. See id Rule 1.7(b).
85. See id Rule 1.9.
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conflicted member of the community about the conflicting matter,
maintaining files in a way that prevents a conflicted member from
having access to them, and so on.86 Moreover, in an academic setting,
it also means requiring conflicted students to absent themselves from
class when the discussion turns to the conflicting matter. Again, this is
a rather strange, but necessary, circumstance in an academic course.
Many law school clinics work closely with the local legal aid pro-
grams, and that is undoubtedly constructive in many ways. It does,
however, increase multiple-client conflict potential. In one state, for
example, "all intake for [legal services in] the state... [is] done by law
students in the Clinic."87 This collaboration is a marvelous educa-
tional experience for the students, but, because confidentiality at-
taches when a prospective client begins communicating with a lawyer,
conflicts can exist between prospective clients and either current or
former clients.88 Being exposed to every legal aid intake interview in
the state dramatically increases the likelihood of confidentiality
breaches and conflicts. The conflict check mechanism needed to pro-
tect against such possibilities needs to be a sophisticated one.
C. Confidentiality Issues Unrelated to Conflicts of Interest
Confidentiality issues attach to in-house clinics that are unrelated to
conflicts concerns, and may be somewhat more troubling than similar
issues in post-law school practice. Students who form short-term rela-
tionships with clients may be less protective of client confidences.
Special effort must be given to instructing students that they may not
use examples from clinic experiences in other classes. That concern
aside, when seminar components of clinical courses permit enrollment
of non-clinic students, special protections must be adopted. The very
purpose of such a class is to have students discuss their cases among
their colleagues. Students who are not members of the clinical "firm"
are not entitled to hear the confidences of the clinic's clients.
The fix for this problem may be a requirement that clinic students
use fictitious names and slightly altered facts when describing their
86. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding
no imputed disqualification of a firm in a security fraud derivative suit where a former
SEC employee was properly screened for all participation in the case and the SEC
turned over applicable information before the firm was retained); Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 (disqualifying a law firm for the conflict of interest of
its attorney through imputation).
87. E-mail from Christine M. McDermott, Supervising Attorney of the Delaware
Civil Clinic at Widener University, to multiple recipients of list at
<lawclinic@lawlib.wuacc.edu> (June 4, 1997) (on file with author).
88. See, e.g., Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1446 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding
that attorneys were disqualified from representing a party against a former client
when both parties were previously joint clients); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990) (stating that a lawyer, without waiver
of confidentiality, must withdraw or decline representation of prospective client when
imparted information affects the representation of other clients).
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cases.8 9 But that fix diminishes the educational value of the seminar
and is unlikely to be a useful experience for any of the students in-
volved.90 Even at that, the fix may be unsuccessful at protecting client
confidences. Control over the range of outside work activities of the
non-clinic students is unlikely. Scattered throughout the community
in various legal work environments, merely hearing the basic fact pat-
tern may be enough to reveal confidences to students who are familiar
with the dispute from their own workplace. The risks are just too
great. Imagine having a law firm discussion of pending matters, even
with an effort to disguise client identities, among a group of colleagues
outside the firm who work at the full range of other legal employers in
the community from legal aid programs, law firms, corporate law of-
fices, and government agency offices. The individuals in such a class
will lack the sense of common mission that is shared by lawyers who
work for the same organization and will have a wide range of diver-
gent interests and commitments. The risk of confidentiality breaches
in such a setting is unacceptably high.
D. The Danger of Saying, "The Education Mission Trumps the
Professional Norms."
Clinics are meant to teach professional norms and critique them. It
would certainly be appropriate to challenge the application of those
norms to the clinical setting. No one should criticize an effort to con-
struct a reasonable argument that different norms should apply to law
school clinics than apply in other practice settings. But these argu-
ments are unlikely to succeed in this context. The norms that underlie
the issues discussed in this paper are central to the profession: protec-
tion of client confidences, loyalty to clients, avoidance or fair resolu-
tion of conflicts of interest. Each is critical to the lawyer's role in all
settings, even if the interpretation of particular applications may vary
from practice setting to practice setting. A successful assault on their
application in law school clinics may be based on the proposition that
education is more valuable than these fundamental norms. That is a
dangerous message to deliver to students, and it is likely to produce
self-serving rationalizations for all manner of client abuses.
CONCLUSION
Clinical legal education generally and in-house clinics particularly
have great value for students, legal education, the legal profession,
and the public. The overarching issues discussed in this Article exist,
however, and need further study and consideration.
None of the law governing lawyers' issues that arise with frequency
regarding in-house clinics is fatal to their operation, but they must be
89. See Venter, supra note 82, at 293.
90. See id. at 293-94.
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attended to just as law firms and government law offices attend to
such issues. Just as in other law offices, the issues can be confronted,
guarded against, and resolved thoughtfully when best efforts to avoid
them fail. The complication in the clinical setting is the educational
mission of the programs. Some of the measures taken to comply with
professional ethics rules diminish the educational value of the clinic.
That is unfortunate but necessary. Failing to be sensitive to the gov-
erning norms of the profession teaches students exactly the wrong
thing., particularly if they observe the disregard given the professions'
norms by their clinic supervisor.
